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1. INTRODUCTION.
The main part of the theory of trade policy implicitly or
explicitly relates to the imposition of tariffs on commodities
destined for final consumption. However, in reality, a
considerable part of world trade takes place in raw materials,
fuels, intermediate goods or capital goods which in
combination with the original factors of production are used
as inputs for the production of final goods. In the actual
tariff structures of countries this is reflected not only in
differences in import duties between commodities but also in
differences according to the nature of goods and the stage of
the production process of the importables.
The fact that internationally trade goods may be both
inputs and outputs has important implications for trade
theory, trade policy and trade negotiations. The most
important implication is the need to recognize that a tariff
on a good used as an input in the production process is
equivalent to a tax on the output of that process which
increases the cost of production. on the other hand, a tariff
on a good being an output in fact implies a subsidy on the
production. Therefore, since protection being given to
economic activities may deviate considerably from the
protection on a commodity, it is necessary to distinguish
sharply between protection of final goods and protection of
production processes.
In literature the protection provided to economic
activities is known as protection of value added or implicit
or effective protection, while the imposition of import duties
on the final good itself is known as explicit or nominal
protection. Although economists have only since 1955 (Barber)
formalized the concept and incorporated it into their
analyses, there is some evidence of a long-standing awareness
of the notion of effective tarifs. Barnett (1976) argues that
the concept was clearly understood by the Canadian Minister of
Finance as far back as 1858-1859 when the Galt tariff was
established.
The intention of the concept of effective protection is
to determine on the basis of one criterion the direction in
which the factors of production are reallocated under the
influence of a tariff structure.
The main analytical contribution is from Corden (1966),
although Balassa (1965) and Johnson (1965) have deserved2
praise in the creation of this theory. The original
contributions had a partial equilibrium character. The general
equilibrium model has been developed in the 1970s influenced
by Batra (1973), Ruffin (1970) and Casas (1973). So far
Eichengreen (1983) has been the only author who presented
effective tariffs within the framework of a macroeconomic
model.
After the introduction, the second section of our survey
highlights the partial analysis of effective protection, while
the third part discusses the general equilibrium model in
terms of a two sector analysis without a monetary sector, and
its implications for welfare. The fourth part elaborates on
the macroeconomic model including a monetary sector and the
fifth section deals with the empirical evidence on effective
protection. The final section explores the policy
implications. From the outset we want to emphasize that the
prevailing theory has been based on the market structure of
perfect competition.
2. PARTIAL ANALYSIS.
2.1. The concept of effective protection.
Effective protection is defined as the increase of the
value-added made possible by the tariff structure in relation
to the value-added in free trade prices. To take an example,
assume that a product has a world market price of f 1,-, for
60 cents consisting of raw materials and for 40 cents of
foreign value-added. If the tariff rate on the final good is
20~, while domestic producers have to pay a duty of 10~ on
their raw materials, then, in order to produce still
competitively, the domestic producer may demand at the maximum
for his product f 1,20. The question is to determine how much
more value he may add in comparison with the foreign producer
in order to survive competition. The excess of the domestic
above the foreign value-added is {f 1,20 - f 0,60 f 10~)} -
f 0,40 - f 0,14, or expressed in terms of the foreign value-
added 35~. This is the effective protection, which equals the
difference between the subsidy on the value-added, 20 cents
divided by 40 cents, that is 50g, and the tax on the value-
added because of the tariff on the inputs, 6 cents divided by
40 cents, that is 15 ~.
2.2. The formula of effective protection.
For product j, assuming that there is only one produced






P~'- value-added per unit of j made possible by the tariff
structure;3
P~ - value-added per unit of j at world market prices, which
in the absence of protection is defined as:
(2) P~-P~ (1-ai~)
where:
ai~ - share of
prices;
P. - price of
T~ie value-added
input i in cost of j at free trade
a unit of j in free trade.
made possible by the tariff structure equals:
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Therefore, the nominal tariff on the final good is a
weighted average of the effective tariff and the tariff on the
input. It appears that the effective tariff rate can deviate
from the nominal rate. There is no divergence between both
rates if t. - ti. The effective rate exceeds the nominal rate
if the tariff rate on the final output is greater than the
rate on the input. The effective rate is at maximum if the
input is imported duty free. The effective rate is lower than
the nominal rate if the tariff on the input is greater than
the rate on the output. The effective rate can be negative
even though the nominal rate is positive. For a given nominal
tariff on the final product the effective rate will be greater
according as the value-added is lower. By differentiating
(4), the comparative statics become clear. Anyhow, it is
evident that the effective tariff rate is consisting of two
elements: a subsidy to domestic producers resulting from the
nominal tariff on the final product and a tax element
resulting from the tariff on the input.
In case there is more than one input, the formula for
effective protection must be adapted. Instead of the tariff
rate on the single input a weighted average of the input
tariffs is relevant. Another complication arises if the actual
input-output statistics under protection do not reveal the
input share that would exist under free trade. In that case
the effective tariff rate can be calculated taking into
account that under protection:
(5) a~~- al(1t ~)1)4
2.3. Negative effective protection.
Above the question of negative effective protection has
been raised. From (1) it appears that a distinction must be
made between a negative numerator and a negative denominator.
The case in which the numerator after protection is negative
can be considered just a curiosum, because continuing domestic
production is deemed to be excluded.
More interesting is the case of negative value-added in
free trade. This phenomenon may be due, for example, to the
existence of transport costs, especially for inputs, or to
divergences in production functions between countries, or to
monopolistic price formation by the foreign supplier who wants
to discourage processing abroad. Under negative value-added in
free trade there would be no production of the final good.
But a sufficiently high tariff on the final good could convert
the negative value-added under free trade into a positive
effective price to bring about domestic production.
It may be concluded that those cases in which the actual
figures show negative outcomes due to negative value-added
under free trade which are made positive by effective
protection, are in fact meaningless. Therefore, the question
arises when is there genuine effective protection? Certainly
not when the denominator is negative. Now there is true
negative protection if the effective tariff rate is between 0
and -100. In case the rate would be less than -100 profitable
production is impossible in the long run. To take an example,
if the input share under free trade is 0,75, the tariff on the
output is 20 per cent and the tariff on the input is 40 per
cent, and the free trade price is f100, the true effective
tariff rate equals -40 per cent. On the other hand, if the
input share is 75 per cent, the tariff on the output is 80 per
cent and the tariff on the input is 20 per cent, then the
(not genuine) effective tariff is -160 and production is not
profitable.
2.4. Non-traded inputs.
In case there are non-traded inputs the question is how
to treat them in the formula of effective protection. Assume
there is a final product j, produced by three inputs, i.e. the
value-added product v, a traded input i and a non-traded input
h, the supply elasticities of which are respectively infinite
for i and positive but less than infinite for v and h. If only
a tariff is raised on the final product, the rise in price of
j is divided up between a rise in the price of v and a rise in
the price of h. Now an effective protective rate for each of
the two protected inputs v and h can be calculated, which can
be shown to depend not only on the nominal tariff on the final
good and on the appropriate input shares, but also on the
ratio between the two supply elasticities. More concretely,
the greater the supply elasticity for an input, given the
supply elasticity of the other input, the lower its effective
rate. In case there is also a tariff on the traded input i,5
these conclusions are not affected.
There are two objections against this approach. First,
there will be many effective rates for any final product, one
for each non-traded input and one for the value-added product.
Second, each input effective rate depends not only on the
elasticity of supply of the input concerned, but also on the
supply elasticities of all the other non-traded inputs and
that of the value-added. Not only will then the simplicity be
lost, but it requires very much information.
To avoid these problems three other methods have been
used to deal with non-traded inputs. Corden (1966) gives non-
traded inputs the same treatment as primary factors of
production, so that the value-added in the protected industry
consists of primary factors and non-traded inputs. The reason
for treating non-traded inputs like this is that the supply
elasticity of these inputs is assumed not to be infinite, so
that not only primary factors but also non-traded inputs are
protected. According to the Balassa method (1965) non-traded
inputs are in infinite elastic supply so that they are to be
treated like traded inputs. Therefore, the input share of the
non-traded inputs h in j must be subtracted in the
denominator.
The Corden method may be considered to be better than the
Balassa method. The reason is that if the price ratio between
importables and exportables does not change, this should not
influence the effective protection. However, according to the
Balassa method factors of production would nevertheless shift
between sectors. For example, if importables are labour
intensive, so that the value-added is relatively high (with
respect to the exportables) and effective protection is
relatively low, factors of production would wrongly reallocate
to the exportables.
According to the Scott method (1970) both in the
numerator and in the denominator non-traded inputs are treated
as traded inputs and therefore subtracted from both.
It may be concluded that the effective tariff outcomes
according to the Corden method are smaller than those of the
Balassa method. Furthermore, the Corden tariff rates are
smaller than those of the Scott method if the Corden effective
tariff rate is greater than the proportional rate of growth of
the prices of non-traded inputs. For data of the sixties it
has been shown that for most countries the outcomes of the
Scott method are between those of Balassa and Corden.
2.5. Substitution.
So far the analysis referred to the assumption of fixed
input-output coefficients. In case substitution is relevant,
there are two possibilities. There may be substitution between
the traded inputs themselves, or between the primary inputs or
value-added and the traded inputs. In both cases there are two6
problems. First, what is the impact of substitution on the
effective protection and second, what errors in measurement
result from the two types of substitution, i.e. is there over-
or understatement of the effective rates?
With respect to the first question it may be concluded
that substitution increases the choices open to the j
industry. Producers have the possibility to save cost by
shifting towards that input where the price has not gone up so
much. The greater the elasticity of substitution, the less the
rise in cost due to a tariff on an input and therefore the
greater the value-added after protection and the greater the
effective protection rate. This holds for both cases of
substitution both for the case in which t~ ~ ti and t~ ~ ti.
With respect to the question of ineasurement, for the case
of substitution between traded inputs, it may be concluded
that it is simple to calculate the correct average input
tariff after protection. However, on the basis of protection
coefficients revealed from input-output statistics, there is
an understatement of the rise in costs of inputs resulting in
an overstatement of the effective protection rate. The
explanation is that after substitution on the basis of
protection coefficients the high tariff input obtains a lower
weight than the low tariff input. Therefore the average input
tariff and thus the rist in cost is understated.
For the case of substitution between value-added and
traded inputs, if t~ ~ ti on the basis of protection data, the
factor ratio i~v is grea~er than the average factor ratio and
this results in an overstatement of the effective tariff rate.
The explanation runs as follows. The factor ratio is greater
than the average of the free trade situation and the
protection situation because the ratio between P~ and P. has
been risen if t~ ~ ti. This causes substitution agains~ the







Differentiating this expression with respect to the factor
ratio i~v always results in a positive sign. Next, differen-
tiating the effective tariff g~ with respect to ai~ results in:
(7) ag' - t'-ti
aa1J (1-ai~) z
This expression is greater or smaller than 0 according as t~
is greater or smaller than ti. For the case in which ti ~ t~,
the factor ratio after protection is lower than the average
and this understatement of i~v also leads to overstatement of
the effective protective rate if protection data are used.2.6. Two concepts of effective protection under substitution.
In the case of substitution between value-added and
traded inputs a distinction must be made between two
definitions of effective protection.
The best known definition of effective protection is from
Corden (1966) which is expressed in terms of the value-added
per unit of output. His value criterion is:
(B)91- V-1
where:
V' respectively V- the value-added per unit of output in the
presence or absence of protection.
The second definition is expressed in terms of the price





P'~ respectively P~ - the price of the only assumed primary
input in protection or free trade.
In the case of complementarity both definitions may be
shown to be equivalent, but in the case of substitution this
does not apply. The explanation is that according to criterion
of Corden the value-added is the product of the price of the
primary input P~ and the physical volume v of this input. If
the tariff on the final product is lower than the tariff on
the input, the relative price of the primary factor decreases,
so that the imported input will replaced by the primary
factor, so that the quantity of the primary factor will
increase. The magnitude of the elasticity of substitution
determines what on balance the effect is on the value-added.
If the elasticity of substitution o, positively defined as the
relative change in the ratio between v and i on account of a
relative change in the price ratio between v and i, is smaller
than unity and if ti ~ t., P~ decreases and v increases but
more, so that gl ~ g2. Next~ scheme presents all possibilities.
tj 1 ti (vl P~t) tj c ti (vt P~1)
g2 ~ gl ~ tj g2 ~ gl ~ tj
92 ~ gl - tj 92 ~ gl - tj
g2 ~ 91 C tj g2 ~ gl ~ tj8
The inequality of the two measures of effective
protection invokes the question which is the most effective
criterion for the anlysis of a tariff structure. The price
measure may be the preferred criterion because only the sign
of g2 indicates unambiguously the direction in which the
factors of production reallocate under the influence of a
change in the tariff structure. On the basis of ineasure gZ it
is possible to determine the change in the output of the
industry concerned.
2.7. Effective protection of labour.
So far the implicit assumption has been that factors of
production are internationally immobile. For labour this is
less unrealistic than for capital. If capital is perfectly
mobile the rate of return of capital will be identical all
over the world and labour will be the only protected factor of
production. The effective protection may then be measured on
the basis of the value-added consisting only of labour cost.
As formula the expression is:
t.-a..t. 1-a-.
J 1J 1 - 1J
(10) e~- 1-asj-k~ g' 1-ai~-k~
where k~ is the capital share in output j.
When, returning to the example of par. 2.1, wages make up
half of the value-added and the cost of capital are the same
everywhere, the extra cost made possible by protection of 14
cents must be compared with labour income of 20 cents.
Therefore, the effective protection for labour will be 70 ~.
This tariff rate can also be deduced by multiplying the effec-
tive tariff g~ by the ratio of the value-added with respect to
labour income. It appears that effective protection with
respect to labour is greater than effective protection with
respect to value-added. Moreover, the effective protection of
labour is a positive function of the capital intensity. This
result is known as the paradox of Basevi, because it is in
contradiction with the Stolper - Samuelson theorem, which
states that wages increase due to protection if labour is used
intensively in the import competing sector, while in the case
of Basevi wages increase according as the import competing
sector is less labour intensive. In our knowledge there is not
yet a solution to this paradox.
2.8. Tariff escalation.
Empirical studies have shown that both nominal and
effective tariffs on intermediate and consumer products
increase with the degree of stages of production. Tariff rates
are often zero or low on raw materials and fuels, higher on
semi-manufactures and highest on final products.9
The only explicit argument in favour of an escalated
tariff structure is from C.L. Barber (1955), who argues that
if the effective rate of protection at the first stage of
production is greater than the nominal tariff rate, tariff
rates at subsequent stages must still be higher to give these
stages the same degree of effective protection as is afforded
at the first stage. Although equalization of effective
protection in all stages of production appears superficially
to be fair and equitable, this does not represent the most
efficient way to achieve the objectives of protection.
There are two reasons for this (Johnson, 1965). First,
some lines of production may have greater social value in the
eyes of protectionists than others, and so warrant more
protection. Second, although equalization of effective
protection will tend to equalize the marginal social cost of
protected production in all lines, this is not a valid measure
to minimize the social cost of protection, because protection
imposes a consumption cost due to the distortion of consumers'
choices and there is no reason to assume that the marginal
consumption cost will be equalized by equal effective rates of
protection.
Barber's proposition is correct only in the special,
clearly unrealistic case in which production processes can be
arranged in a chain such that each process uses as inputs only
original factors of production and the output of the preceding
process in the chain. And even if this condition holds, then
still it depends on the magnitudes of the input coefficients.
Therefore, a general solution does not exist for the relative
magnitudes of tariff rates to be applied to different stages
of production.
2.9. Net effective protection.
So far an important consequence of protection has been
left out of consideration. The imposition of tariffs makes it
possible to maintain equilibrium on the balance of payments at
a lower exchange rate, because protection improves the balance
of payments and appreciates the currency. However, the lower
the exchange rate, the lower is the price of imports and the
less the protection being afforded. Therefore, the net
protection must be determined after taking into account the
appreciation of the currency due to protection.
To take an example, assume that in free trade the
exchange rate is DM 1- f 1,10 and under protection DM 1- f
1,--, so that the domestic currency appreciates. In free trade
a world market price of DM 1 amounts to f 1,10, while with a
tariff rate of 20 g the domestic price equals f 1,20.
Therefore, the net nominal protection has resulted in an
increase of the domestic price from f 1,10 to f 1,20, that is
9.1 per cent.10
The same reasoning applies to the concept of effective
protection. To take the example of par. 2.1, it concerns the
comparison of the domestic value-added after protection of
f 0,54 with the value-added at free trade prices of f 0,44,
which has been calculated on the basis of the exchange rate in
free trade of DM 1- f 1,10. The net effective protection now
is not 35 per cent, but 22.7 per cent, i.e. f 0,54 - f 0,44
over f 0,44. The net effective rate of protection can be
determined as:
(il) 9N-(lt9) e -1
e
The conclusion is that the exchange rate at protection
leads to an overvaluation of the domestic currency with
respect to free trade, so that the effective rate of
protection calculated on the basis of the exchange rate under
protection has been overstated too. Therefore, in determining
the net effective rate of protection, it is necessary to make
an adjustment for the overvaluation of the currency in
comparision with the situation under free trade. The
adjustment of the exchange must be considered as an integral
component of the effect of a structure of protection.
2.10. Effective protection versus domestic resource cost.
Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) is related to the same
category as the effective protection rate (EPR). DRC is a
method, developed in Israel in the early 195os, of evaluating
comtemplated investment projects. These projects should be
evaluated on the basis of the real opportunity cost in terms
of total domestic resources of producing ( or saving) a net
marginal unit of foreiqn exchange. The affinity of both
concepts has led to a controversy about the similarities and
differences of the two measures and the superiority of one
over the other.
The initiator of the concept is Bruno (1963). Later
Krueger (1966 and 1972), Balassa and Schydlowsky (1968 and
1972) participated in the discussion. A distinction can be
made between the approaches of Bruno and Krueger on the one
hand and of Balassa and Schydlowsky on the other hand. Bruno
and Krueger use DRC as an investment criterion for the optimal
selection of new projects in which tradeables are produced.
More concretely, domestic resources should be reallocated into
those export sectors where DRC are low and out of those import
competing sectors where DRC are high. Balassa and Schydlowsky
contest the approach of Bruno and Krueger and they maintain
that not the DRC but the effective protection of each industry
points to the correct ranking of the relative efficiency of
industries. Finally, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1978) have shown
that the EPR is not an appropriate measure for project-
evaluation and that DRC, if it must yield the correct social
evaluation of a project, must use second-best shadow prices.
We try to present the different arguments as succinctly as11
possible.
Balassa and Schydlowsky define the cost of a unit of
foreign exchange as the direct and indirect domestic resource
costs (value-added) incurred in supplying it domestically,
divided by the difference between the foreign price of the
product and the foreign exchange cost of direct and indirect
imported inputs. In other words, DRC is the ratio between the
domestic value-added in local currency divided by the value
added in foreign currency. To take an example, if the sum of
the direct and indirect domestic value-added is f 8,64, the
c.i.f. import price ten dollars and there is an expenditure of
six dollars on direct and indirect imported inputs, then the
domestic resource cost of a dollar will be f 2,16, (j 8,64
divided by ~10 - S6). If the exchange rate is j 1,80 to the
dollar, application of these data results in:
(12)DRC-
(~lOf ~6)Íl,gp-1.2
This ratio indicates that the domestic resource cost of one
dollar amounts to f 2,16, i.e. the exchange rate of f 1,80 per
dollar times 1.2.
The relation between the concepts of DRC and EPR can be
written as:
(13)DRC-EPRt1
Generally, the formulas of DRC and EPR will give a
different ranking of domestic industries. Balassa and
Schydlowsky demonstrate this with an example in which there
are two import competing industies: the clothing industry and
the precision equipment industry. They assume that for
precision instruments steel is a protected input while the
fabrics used by the clothing industry are not protected.
Furthermore, they assume that the production of precision
equipment is efficient in the sense that the domestic value-
added equals the value-added under free trade, while this is
not the case for the clothing sector. The production costs in





Labour Foreign Total Labour Foreign Total
Exchan e Exchange
Clothing
Fabrics 6 10 16 6 10 16
Direct labor 6 6 4 4
Total 12 10 22 10 10 20
Precision equipment
Steel 10 10 20 6 10 16
Direct labor 4 4 4 4
Total 14 10 24 10 10 20
On the basis of these figures the effective tariff for
clothing is 50 per cent, while for precision equipment it is
nil:
EPR~ - ( 6 - 4 ) : 4 - 0 . 5 and EPRP - ( 4 - 4 ) : 4 - 0 .
The effective tariff for the inputs is:
EPRf -(6 - 6): 6- 0 and EPR9 -(10 - 6): 6- 0.67.
However, in terms of DRC the clothing industry ranks
ahead of precision equipment manufacturing:
DRC~ - 12 : (20 - 10) - 1.2.
DRCp - 14 : (20 - 10) - 1.4.
The explanation of these results is that DRC is lower in
the clothing industry, (a relatively inefficient industry)
than in the production of precision equipment, because the
material input in fabrics is not protected, while the precisi-
on instruments industry is penalized by the protection of the
steel industry. Therefore, it may be concluded that the effec-
tive rate of protection indicates the relative performance of
processing activities, while DRC is affected not only by
inefficiencies in the manufacuring of the product itself as
well as in the production of its inputs.
The ranking of domestic industries according to DRC
reflects the implicit assumption that all existing industries
will be maintained and that the expansion of the output of any
one product will require increased output of domestic sectors
providing inputs into it, so that no substitution can take13
place between domestic and foreign inputs. In this relation it
may be noted that it would hardly be correct if the past
establishment of an inefficient steel industry would jeopardi-
ze the chances of setting up efficient precision equipment
industries. If the aim is that ultimately all industries
should become competitive on the world market, the desirabili-
ty of individual industries should be evaluated on the basis
of effective rates of protection rather than on the basis of
domestic resource cost.
According to these considerations Balassa and Schydlowsky
point to the superiority of the measure of effective protecti-
on over that of domestic resource cost. In essence, the con-
troversy concerned the question whether the analysis should be
made about the final stage of the production process or about
all preceding stages combined. The concept of effective pro-
tection concerns the cost of protection in the final stage of
the production process of a product, while the DRC concept
relates to the cost of protection of the national economy as a
whole. It could be postulated that EPR is a private measure
for the allocation of resources, while DRC provides a criteri-
on for a social cost-benefit analysis of new projects.
Finally, we consider the approach of Bhagwati and
Srinivasan, who pose the question: if for given distortions in
the form of a tariff or trade subsidy, defining a current
resource allocation, would the introduction of a project which
withdraws resources from this existing allocation for project
use be welfare-improving? In this connection Little and
Mirrlees have formulated a celebrated criterion: a project is
acceptable if it will increase the value of total production
at world prices as compared with the existing situation. In
equivalent terms the question is whether the world price of a
unit of output of the project exceeds or falls short of its
cost of the primary factors of production evaluated in terms
of their "second best" shadow prices. This question relates to
a second best situation because the distortion ís maintained.
At given world prices and distorted production coefficients
shadow prices indicate what the rentals for the factors may
be.
Bhagwati and Srinivasan consider six measures of DRC to
be compared with one measure for ERP. They make use of factor
valuations corresponding to the first-best optimal situation
in terms of international prices. Next, they use factor valua-
tions reflecting the second best situation given the distorti-
on. Finally, they use actually ruling factor valuations.
Moreover, for each variety they consider the presence of
intermediate inputs either in the form of direct outputs
produced by other sectors or in the form of intermediates
decomposed into the primary factors labour and capital. They
show that taking the distorted situation as given, DRC's using
second-best shadow factor prices will lead to a correct accep-
tance of the project if the DRC equals or is smaller than
unity and to a correct rejection if DRC exceeds unity. The
DRC's on the basis of first best shadow prices are inappropri-14
ate because these are calculated as if world prices rule
domestically and as if the ruling distortion is denied. The
DRC's on the basis of the actual private market prices are
also inappropriate because the efficiency requirement accor-
ding to the world market is denied. For a correct acceptance
or rejection of a project it is required that traded goods are
to be evaluated at world prices and that the domestic primary
factors are to be evaluated at second best shadow prices. This
makes the EPR an inappropriate measure since it makes use of
actual prices for the factors of production, while for
products world market prices are applied. Therefore, Bhagwati
and Srinivasan judge it is best to drop the concept of EPR
altogether from cost-benefit analysis.
3. TWO-SECTOR ANALYSIS.
An important objective of the theory of effective
protection is to analyse in which direction the factors of
production are reallocated under the influence of protection.
In the partial analysis a positive effective rate of
protection would lead to a higher output level for the
protected commodity. The question now is whether in the
general equilibrium model the same resource-allocational
implications arise.
The model as developed by Batra (1973) has two
domestically produced final goods: c the exportable good and m
the importable good. There is an intermediate good q imported
from abroad and used as an input in the importable good m.
There is full employment of both factors, capital (K) and
labour (L), perfect competition and variable production
coefficients.
Full employment requires:
( 14 ) L-aLcsotarmsm
(15 ) K-axcsc}ax~M
where ai~ represent the amount of the ith factor per unit of
the jth product. The magnitude of ai~ depends upon the input
prices:
(16) a1C-ai~(w, r) (i-K, L)
(17 ) aim-aim ( w, r, PQ) ( i-K, L, 4)
The price equations are given by:
(18 ) az,~~`'}ax~r-P~
(19) al,r,w}a,~„r}a~,PQ-Pm15
Differentiation of the price equations, taking into account
cost minimization, results in:
(20) 9~,rw}6rarr-P~
(21) 6~w}8K„~r-Pm-6~Pq
where the distribution shares are defined as e.g.: 9Lc -
In thePéxport sector free trade rules, while the m sector is
characterized by effective protection.
Solving (20) and (21) shows that the factor rentals
result only after paying for the cost of intermediate imported
inputs, i.e. value-added consists of the factor rentals:
(22) [v--~ (Pm-B~PQ) --~9m(1-e~)
(23) r-~Pm-9~,Pa) - eéi 9m(1-6Q„~)
where the determinant of the distribution shares equals:
(24) ~6l-ec.ce~-ex~ez.m
and where the effective protection is defined as:
tm-9~tg- Pm-6~Pg
(25) 9m- 1-9ym 1-6~
If the c good is labour intensive, ~A~ ~ 0, the grant of
effective protection causes nominal wages to fall and the
nominal reward of capital to rise. Since Pc is constant, the
decline in w and the rise in r amount to a decline in the real
wage rate and a rise in the real rental of capital in terms of
the c good. Since Pm has risen due to protection real wages
have also fallen in terms of the m good. However, there is no
certainty with respect to the real reward of capital in terms
of the m good. From (23) we obtain:
Pm (e~,tB~,eL~ ) -BL~AamPa
(26)i'-Pm-
e~
This result is positive if:
( 27 ) Pm ~ ez.csym
PQ et~e~mte~m16
Since the right-hand side is less than unity, a sufficient
condition for the real reward of capital to rise is that the
nominal tariff on the final good exceeds that on the imported
input.
Next the effects of effective protection for resource
allocation can be analysed. This requires differentiation of
(16) and (17) resulting in:
( 2 ó ) c~àLc-eLCaLLw}eXCQLKr
(29 ) áK~-6L~Q~`a,[vt9K~Qiar
( 3 0 ) ~r„~-e~„aii,wte~Q~rt9v~aLqPq
(31) áK,,,-9j,,,a~,Wt9X,,,a~rt9yp,aKQPy
Here use has been made of the partial elasticity of
substitution between factors:
(32) ~w` á c-9ua~ (i-K,L)
where aLL represents the partial elasticity of substitution of
labour. Of course, the direct partial elasticities of
substitution are negative and the indirect ones are positive.
Now all the ingredients are present to illustrate this
section in terms of diagrams. We want to show diagrammatically
that effective protection may lead to the paradox of a decline
in the relative output of the protected commodity and to a
change in the structure of production in favour of the
exportable product.
Under effective protection there are different methods to
protect the import competing sector:
1) to increase the tariff on the import of the final product;
2) to decrease the tariff on the importable intermediate good;
3) a combination of a tariff on the output and the input such
that Pm - Aqm.Pq ~ 0.
ad 1) When protection is provided by an output tariff alone a
perverse result is not possible. This may be shown in figure
1, in which the transformation lines of labour and capital
have been drawn assuming that the import competing m-sector is
relatively capital-intensive and the c-sector relatively
labour-intensive. If protection is granted to the m-sector in
the form of a nominal tariff on the import of m-goods, Pm will
rise and Pq will remain constant. Hence w will fall and r will17
rise, so that in both sectors the labour coefficient will rise
and the capital coefficient will fall as appears in figure 1
from the downward shift of the labour line and the upward
shift of the capital line. Full employment of both factors
requires that the output of the c-good will fall and that of
the m-good will rise. Therefore, a rise in the tariff on the
final product alone brings about the normal result for the
structure of production.
ad 2) When protection is granted in the form of a fall in the
tariff on the imported input, Pq falls. The effective
protection in the m-sector rises because Pm - AqmP ~ 0, so
that w falls and r rises. In the c-export sector t~e labour
coefficient will rise and the capital coefficient will fall so
that the labour line falls and the capital line rises. In the
import competing m-sector the outcome is not so certain as in
the c-sector, because the change in the factor coefficients is
dependent upon the change of w~P respectively r~P Since r
has risen and P has fallen, r~Pq has risen. Moreover, r~w has
risen, so that ~or both reasons ~he capital coefficient in the
m-sector falls and the intercept on the horizontal axis rises.
With respect to the wage rate, which has fallen, there are two
possibilities: the proportional fall in wages is greater or
smaller than the proportional fall of the price of the
imported inputs.18
In the first case in which Pq~w and r~w rise, there is
substitution against the imported input and in favour of
labour, so that the labour coefficient increases and the
intercept on the horizontal axis for labour falls. In this
case the structure of the production moves in the same normal
direction as in the case of a tariff on the final product, so
that figure i holds again.
In the second case in which Pq~w falls and r~w rise,
there is substitution against labour and in favour of the
imported input and if this last effect is strongly enough the
labour coefficient in the m-sector will fall, so that the
intercept on the horizontal axis for labour will increase. The
capital coefficient in the m-sector will fall, so that the
intercept on the horizontal axis for capital will increase
too. This case has been illustrated in figure 2.






It appears that if the decrease of aLm is sufficiently
great the structure of production may change against the
import competing industry. For this perverse result to be
possible it is necessary that not only 'r ~ w~ P, but also
that the intermediate imported input is a betterqsubstitute
for labour than that labour is a substitute for capital, i.e.
vLq ~ aL~ ~ aLx. The reason is that according to (30) the
change in aLm is determined not only by a positive aLQ via the
positive sign of w- Pq, but also by a positive oLK via the
negative sign of w- r. The first effect decreases a~ and the19
second effect increases aLm, so that on balance aLm decreases
under the condition mentioned above.
ad 3) Considering the combination of a tariff on the final
product and on the imported input such that the effective rate
of protection is positive the assumption is that both Pm ~ O
and P3 ~ 0. The necessary condition for a perverse production
result is that Pq ~'r ~ w. Since w-'r ~ 0, in the labour-
intensive c-exportsector the labour coefficient will rise and
the capital coefficient will fall, i.e. on the vertical axis
the intercept for labour will decrease and that for capital
will increase. In the importcompeting m-sector the labour
coefficient will rise, so that on the horizontal axis the
intercept for labour decreases. Since Pq~r rises, in the m-
sector the capital coefficient may rise if capital is a better
substitute for the imported input than that capital is a
substitute for labour, because due to w- r ~ 0 a~ falls and
due to ' r - P q ~ 0 a~ rises and under the condition mentioned
the latter effect dominates so that on the horizontal axis the
intercept for capital will decrease. Under these circumstances
the structure of production will change in a perverse
direction as is illustrated in figure 3.
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For a small country confronted with a given international
price ratio it will be illustrated in figure 4 that in the
case of effective protection under fixed production
coefficients the pursuit of free trade is the optimal policy.
However, it must be noted that in case effective protection
increases by lowering both the nominal tariff on the final
product and on the imported input the underlying mathematical
model shows that the welfare effects are not unambiguous.
In figure 4 it has been assumed that effective protection
increases by a rise of the tariff on the final product and on
the imported input. In order to clarify that figure we note
firstly that, just as in the case of nominal protection, the
value of national expenditure in terms of, say, c-goods
exceeds the value of national production in c-goods because of
the tariff revenue, so that due to protection the budget line
both for consumers and producers shifts downward. Secondly,
in the case of intermediate imports, there will be a
difference in slope of the budget line facing consumers and
producers, i.e. the marginal rate of substitution in
consumption (MRS) will exceed the marginal rate of
transformation in production (MRT), because Pm~P~ exceeds
Vm~P~, where Vm (expressing the value-added in the m-sector),21
equals Pm-a P. The MRS equals Pm(iftm)JP~, whereas the MRT
equals Vm(l~gm)~P~, i.e. consumers face nominal protection
while producers face effective protection with respect to the
value-added.
Figure 4 illustrates that free trade is the optimal
policy for the case in which there is no substitution. Under
free trade in production point P for the producer holds: V JP~
- ABJBP, while for the consumer applies: ABJBD - PmJP~. This
means that in terms of m-goods the intermediate imports equal
BP - BD - DP. Exports of the c-good equal PH, while imports of
the m-good are HC. The welfare level under free trade is
maximal because the imposition of a tariff on the final
product alone without any tariff on the imported input will
lower welfare. The new production point will be P', where the
output of m is larger than at P. Due to protection the budget
lines facing producers and consumers shift inward. Consumers
will not move to an indifference curve tangent to their new
budget line because due to the tariff the marginal private
cost deviate from the marginal social cost which equal the new
budget line. The new consumption equilibrium is in C' which
has a lower welfare index than free trade consumption point C.
If now a tariff is imposed on the imported input the
production of m-good will be reduced and that of the c-good
expanded so that the production point moves back in the
direction of the free trade point, but this does not change
the conclusion achieved, so that effective protection brought
about by positive tariffs on the final output and imported
input reduces welfare. For the case in which there is
substitution the welfare effects are not unambiguous because
of the possibility of a perverse production effect.
This kind of analysis has been extended by the
contributions of Ruffin (1970) and Casas (1973). Under fixed
coefficients Ruffin has questioned what, keeping fixed the
tariff on the final product, the second best tariff on the
intermediate product will be that minimizes the welfare loss.
He has shown that the welfare loss will be minimal if the
effective tariff is zero. This occurs if the tariff on the
intermediate product satisfies: tq - tmJA~. The second best
tariff on the intermediate good is larger than the tariff on
the final good since the cost of the intermediate good is only
a fraction of the total cost of the m-product. The second best
tariff decreases the production of the m-good so that
production returns to the free trade production point P. The
budget line for consumers shifts upward and consumers will
choose a point such as C" with a welfare index higher than
C'.
On the other hand, Casas has questioned what, given an
unchanged tariff on the imported input, the tariff on the
final product will be that minimizes the welfare loss. He
concludes that the optimal second best effective tariff now is
negative.22
For the asymmetry between the two cases he offers an
intuitive explanation. The initial imposition of a tariff on
the final product brings about a production and a consumption
loss. When a tariff on the intermediate good is levied such
that gm - 0, the production loss will be mitigated because
production returns to its free trade structure, although the
original consumption loss will be maintained. The initial
imposition of a tariff on the intermediate good entails only a
production loss. If subsequently a tariff on the final product
is introduced the production loss is reduced but a consumption
loss is created. Minimization of the consumption loss now
requires a negative second best effective tariff.
4. MACRO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS.
Eichengreen (1983) analyses the role of effective
protection in a disaggregated portfolio balance model in the
presence of rational expectations. He presents a model in
which the real and the nominal exchange rate are jointly
determined by equilibrium in the goods and asset markets. The
real exchange rate is defined as the tariff-exclusive relative
price of imports and exports and the nominal exchange rate as
the domestic currency price of a unit of foreign currency.
When a tariff is imposed on imports of final goods alone,
both the real and the nominal exchange rates appreciate in the
long run. When a tariff is imposed on imports of intermediate
goods alone, both exchange rates depreciate in the long run. A
central implication is that for a given ad valorem duty on
imports of intermediate goods, the higher the effective rate
of protection, the greater the appreciation of the real and
nominal exchange rate. The imposition of a tariff is
protective in the sense that it induces a flow of resources
out of the exportables sector and into the importables sector,
when the percentage change in the real exchange rate is
smaller in absolute value than the effective rate of
protection. Therefore, the effective rate of protection as
such is an inadequate measure of the protective effect of a
tariff for a country capable of influencing its terms of
trade.
The country considered is capable of influencing the
world price of its exportables P~e, the reciprocal of which is
the real exchange rate er - e~P. The effective rate of




where: ~ stands for the ratio of the tariff on final goods and
on intermediate goods: ~- tZ~tn, and where b is the input-
output coefficient. This ERP is positive when ~ ís greater
than b. When ~- 1, nominal and effective rates of protection
are equal.23
In this model a distinction has been made between the
exchange-rate effects of protection in the short run and in
the long run.
In the short run, the nominal and real exchange rates
adjust to clear asset and commodity markets. At any moment in
time, the nominal exchange rate is determined by equilibrium
in asset markets. For a given stock of outside money,
portfolio balance implies that an increase in foreign assets
F, which raises the share of foreign exchange in domestic
wealth, must be offset by a fall in e. For a given solution of
e, there is a real exchange rate which clears the market for
exportables so that the supply of exportables equals the
domestic demand plus the foreign demand for exportables.
Both saving and expenditure are dependent on net national
income, which is the sum of the proceeds from the sale of
domestic goods, net of the cost of imported inputs, plus
transfer payments received from the government which neutrally
redistributes the tariff revenue. This net national income is
either saved or spent on the purchase of final goods.
New saving, to be distinguished from saving due to capital
gains on existing wealth, is a fraction of the discrepancy
between target and current wealth deflated by the consumer
price index.
In the long run the additional requirement is that the
trade balance is zero, i.e. when there is equality between
actual and desired wealth.
Figure 5 illustrates the foregoing argumentation.
Portfolio balance, é- 0, requires that an increase in F,
which raises the share of foreign exchange in domestic wealth,
must be offset by a fall in e. If F is higher (lower) than the
equilibrium value, F must go down (up) again what happens if e
rises (falls). This explains the direction of the arrows above
and below the é- 0 line. For trade balance equilibrium, F-
0, an increase in e which improves the trade balance must be
offset by an increase in F which increases spending relative
to income. If e is higher (lower) than the equilibrium one,
foreign assets are accumulated (decumulated) so that the
arrows point to the right (left).
As is commonly the case in rational expectations models,
the steady state, Eo, is a saddle-point , so that
possibilities of instability dominate. However, there is a
stable arm. This has been indicated in figure 5 by curve SS,
which is achieved by combining the possible arrows in the four
possible regions of the figure.
The structure of protection crucially determines the
effect of a tariff on the nominal and real exchange rate. Only
a non-technical interpretation of the results will be
provided. Three cases will be considered.24
The first case will be illustrated in figure 6 and
concerns a tariff on imported inputs alone implying that ~- 0
and that the ERP is negative.
Both the nominal and real exchange rate depreciate in the
long run. As the cost of imported inputs increase, the
relative price of importables decreases so that the production
of importables is reduced and of exportables in increased. For
trade balance equilibrium demand for importables must decrease
too and that for exportables must increase and this requires a
depreciation of the real exchange rate. In the long run trade
balance equilibrium implies that saving is zero so that there
is no change in the stock of real money balances and in the
consumer price index. In the case of a real depreciation this
only holds if the nominal exchange rate depreciates and the
price level of domestic goods decreases.
The tariff on imported intermediate goods causes a trade
balance deficit and a decrease in the holdings of foreign
assets so that the F- 0 schedule shifts to the left. The
stable arm leading to the new steady state also shifts upward.
The nominal exchange rate depreciates immediately to the point
directly above Eo on the new stable arm and continues to
depreciate along the stable arm until the new steady state has
been achieved.
Secondly, a tariff on final imports alone results in the
long run in an appreciation of the real and the nominal
exchange rate. Firstly, with respect to the real exchange25
rate, the imposition of a tarif switches expenditure toward
exportables just as tariff revenue does. To prevent that
demand exceeds supply the real exchange rate must appreciate.
Secondly, with respect to the nominal exchange rate, the
tariff raises the price level reducing real cash balances and
lowering actual wealth relative to desired wealth. To restore
the equality between actual and target wealth, the price level
must fall. The price of exportables P may rise or fall. If P
rises, e must fall to bring about the necessary decline in the
price level. If P falls, e must decline not only to bring
about the reduction in the price level, but also to achieve
the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Therefore, the
nominal exchange rate unambiguously appreciates.
The dynamics of this case are demonstrated in figure 7.
Since the imposition of a tariff on final goods alone leads to
an appreciation of the exchange rate, the holdings of foreign
exchange increase so that the F- 0 schedule shifts to the
right. The stable arm also shifts to the right. In order to
achieve the new steady state the nominal exchange rate must
appreciate while the home country is running a series of trade
balance surpluses.
Although tariffs on final goods alone with positive ERP
induce exchange rate appreciations and duties on intermediate
goods with negative ERP induce exchange rate depreciations, it











exchange rate unaffected. In that case aggregate supply is not
affected, but the demand for exportables has been stimulated
because its relative price has fallen. For goods market
equilibrium expenditure must be switched toward importables
requiring appreciation of the real exchange rate. In order to
restore equilibrium on the asset market, as before, the
nominal exchange rate must appreciate.
Thirdly and finally, the relationship between the ERP,
the real exchange rate and the direction of resource flows can
be determined. The effect of a tariff on the allocation of
resources depends on its impact on erV, the tariff-inclusive
price of value added in the production of importables relative
to the price of exportables, where V- 1- b t(~ - b)tn is
the value added per unit of importables produced. If the
change of erV is positive (negative) production of importables
will increase (decrease) relatively. Total differentiation
yields:
(34) d dt~ -er dt {Vdtr-(l-b) f(1-b) dtZ
n n n n
Resources flow out of the production of exportables and into
the production of importables when der~dt~ is greater than -
(~ - b)~(1 - b), i.e. the percentage change in the real
exchange rate due to the imposition of a tariff must be lessz7
in absolute value than the change ín the effective rate of
protection. When ~- 1 so that a uniform ad valorem tariff is
imposed on final goods and intermediate goods, resources will
be drawn into exportable production when der~dtn ~-1. This is
the well-known Metzler paradox when the appreciation of the
real exchange rate, i.e. the improvement of the terms of
trade, exceeds the rate at which the imports are taxed.
According to Metzler the condition for the paradox to hold was
that the marginal propensity to spend on exportables exceeds
the foreign elasticity of demand for the domestic export good.
Therefore, the relative price of exportables increases and
that of importables decreases when the foreign demand
elasticity is sufficiently low.
5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE.
The empirical evidence on effective protection can be
divided into partial and general equilibrium studies. The
partial analyses such as those of Balassa (1971) are generally
of an old date, while the general equilibrium studies such as
those by Deardorff and Stern (1983, 1985) are of a more recent
date. Underneath we discuss briefly the most important results
as well as a number of empirical aspects considered by other
authors.
First, national input-output tables which serve as a
source for effective protectíon rates are frequently over a
decade old. If production processes have changed considerably
in this interval, the effective protection rates may be
seriously in error. For the United States on the basis of data
of 1971 with use of 10-year-old production coefficients Yeats
(1976a) has found an average error of approximately 9 per cent
and this figure increases to 15 per cent when 20-year-old
production information is employed.
A second question concerns the point that in many
developing contries production costs and value added lack the
stability these elements assume in industrial nations and may
vary widely from year to year. In this connection for three
developing countries, Sri Lanka, Iran and Pakistan, in 25
basic industries with data for the pre-1970 period, Yeats
(1976b) has tested empirically the sensitivity of the
effective protection to short-term changes in value added. His
results indicate that the variation of the value added is so
extreme as to render point estimates of the effective rate of
protection inaccurate. Differences in the high-low estimates
of the effective rate of protection range from 20 to 100
percent regularly. The explanation for the low and unstable
value added in developing countries lies in the greater
fluctuations in export earnings than in industrial nations and
in the fact that developing countries generally have higher
material and fuel costs relative to wages and many of these
prices are more flexible than wages. Therefore, a small
absolute change in an already small denominator has a large
effect.zs
Finally, we note that the existing theory of effective
protection has been based on competitive behavior. Under
monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures, protection
not only permits the establishment of processing activities
that would not survive under free trade, but also gives rise
to excess profits. This question has been largely omitted in
literature. The only exception is a study by Staelin (1976)
who has formulated a general-equilibrium model embodying
noncompetitive pricing assumptions tested on data for 25
sectors from the Ivory Coast for 1970. He showed that when
tariffs are altered, different assumptions about the pricing
behavior of industries do lead to different predictions of
resource reallocation. This pricing behavior, employing rules
of markup over marginal cost, concerns the extent to which
changes in costs are passed on to customers. A surprising
outcome is that in the case of complete passing on to
customers the elimination of tariffs leads to a 40 percent
fall in waqes and a 4.5 percent appreciation of the exchange
rate. The implication seems to be that tariffs protect labor
in the Ivory Coast. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not
apply here because of the noncompetitive pricing assumptions.
The opposite movement of the exchange rate would normally be
expected. However, Staelin did not provide an intuitive
explanation of the appreciation.
5.1. Partial evidence.
A general conclusion about the structure of protection
from partial studies is that effective rates of protection are
higher than nominal rates of protection (Balassa, 1971).
Effective rates of protection vary much more widely than
nominal rates. This variation is partly a reflection of
differences among sectors in regard to nominal rates of
protection on output and on tradeable inputs, and is partly
due to intersectoral differences in the shares of value added
and tradeable inputs, (Balassa 1982). Moreover, there is a
strong tendency to discriminate in favor of manufacturing and
against primary activities. In the World Development Report of
1986 the same tendency is shown, although the discrimination
against agriculture is decreasing over time.
In his 1982 study Balassa has estimated the net effective
rate of protection after adjusting for overvaluation for six
countries at the end of the 1960s: Argentina, Colombia,
Israel, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. When the most likely
values of the relevant elasticities were used in these
countries the overvaluation in percentages amounted to
respectively: 40; 13; 51; 9.1; 6; and 4.9. The net effective
protection rates are summarized in table 2.29
Table 2.
Net effective protection Primary sector Manufacturing
Argentina, 1969 -29 38
Colombia, 1969 -20 10
Zsrael, 1968 -8 7
Korea, 1968 1 -il
Singapore, 1967 5 -4
Taiwan, 1969 -8 9
The disincentives to primary products were most pronounced in
Argentina. Except in Korea and Singapore the incentives appear
to have induced resources into manufacturing industries.
Cohen (1971) has compared for 26 countries mostly in the
early 1960s the ranking of industries on the basis of nominal
and effective rates of protection. He has observed that the
rank correlation coefficient between effective and nominal
rates is above .70 for 23 of the 26 countries. Moreover, there
is a strong linear relation between the effective rate of
protection for an industry and its nominal rate of protection,
so that:
Effective tariff - a t b(Nominal tariff).
The percentage of variation explained by the regression ranges
from 92 percent (in EEC 1959) to 1 percent for Turkey. On the
basis of these findings Cohen concludes that it is sufficient
to know the nominal tariffs. It is not worthwhile to calculate
effective tariffs if nominal tariffs are good substitutes. His
results suggest: "one learns a lot - but not everything - by
looking at the ranking of industries by nominal tariffs."
On this question Guisinger and Schydlowski (1971) reach a
somewhat different conclusion: "One learns something but by no
means everything about the levels of effective rates of
protection among industries by studying the levels of nominal
tariffs on their output." Firstly, they demonstrate that the
observed accuracy of nominal rates in predicting the absolute
levels of effective rates is largely due to the level of
aggregation in the classification of industries. With a
greater disaggregation in the number of industrial
classifications the quality of the correlations between
effective and nominal rates of protection deteriorates. The
coefficients of determination indicating how much of the
variance in the dependent variable is explained by the
independent variable are lower for the disaggregated equations
than for the aggregated ones. Secondly, the regression
equations between nominal and effective rates of protection
are different between countries so that the parameters of that
relationship cannot be "borrowed" by another country wishing
to estimate absolute levels of effective protection from the
levels of its own nominal tarif rates. Therefore, the
necessity to calculate effective rates remaíns.30
The reason why Cohen was able to make such an optimistic
statement is that he unnecessarily restricts the uses of
effective rates to two applications:
1) as a means of comparing the level of protection among
various countries or industries;
2) as a way of determining the effect of the tariff structure
on resource allocation within a country.
However, Cohen omits an important third use of effective
rates: the measurement of the static welfare costs of tariff
protection. Although the direction of the resource allocative
effects can be determined knowing only the relative position
of industries according to their effective rates, the welfare
costs can be calculated only by knowing the absolute level of
effective protection.
Basevi has found for the United States on the basis of
data of the 1950s that effective rates of protection are about
one and a half times as high as nominal tariff rates, and
effective rates of protection on value added by labor are from
about four to five times as high as nominal tariff rates.
It has been observed that protection tends to escalate
from lower to higher levels of transformation. Recent
estimates of tariff escalation are in Hufbauer and Scott
(1985) who show that the average nominal tariffs for final
products are approximately four times higher than those for
raw materials in the most important OECD countries. This
tariff escalation points to the existence of discrimination
against the processed exports of final industrial products
from developing countries and this tends to prolong the
traditional role of developing countries as a supplier of raw
materials. There is indication of a negative correlation
between the degree of protection of processed goods and the
relative share of these products in imports from developing
countries.
However, looking at the results of the Tokyo Round of
multilateral trade negotiations (1973-1979), it must be
admitted that a step in the right direction has been taken
when compared with the results of the Kennedy Round (1963-
1967). As a result of the Kennedy Round the nominal and
effective tariff reductions on exports of processed goods







Stage II 29 31
Stage III 30 31
Stage IV 24 2631
However, for all industrial countries as a whole, decreases in
nominal and effective rates of protection in manufactured
products has been larger: 40 percent in nominal and 42 percent
in effective duties. As a result of the Kennedy Round, nominal
tariffs on manufactured goods imported into the developed
countries from the developing countries were nearly double
(6.5 versus 11.8 percent) and effective duties on these
products more than double (11.1 versus 22.6 percent) the
corresponding tariffs on developed countries' total imports of
manufactured goods. Table 4 presents the results of the Tokyo
Round for products which are of potential interest for the
developing countries.
Table 4.
Tariff cut New tariff
Raw materials 32 1.4
Semifinished manufactures 32 6.1
Finished manufactures. 39 7.5
Source: GATT 1979, p. 122.
The average nominal tariff reduction on products of potential
interest for developing countries amounts to 35 percent, what
is comparable with the tariff reduction of 38 percent on all
industrial products. Estimates of post-Tokyo Round rates of
effective protection at this level of detail are not
available.
Not only developed countries try to protect their
domestic production processes through tariff escalation, but
also developing countries make extensive use of export taxes
for primary products. Golub and Finger (1979) show that
developing countries' export taxes are higher if products are
exported in the primary rather than the processed form. As an
avenue of mutual interest this suggests the possibility of a
simultaneuous reduction of export taxes on primary goods by
developing countries and import tariffs on processed products
by developed countries. Based on 1973 trade flows they have
estimated the effects for 8 products. The aggregate result is
a decline of processing in developed countries of less than 1
percent, while processing in developing countries would
increase by more than 8 percent. The explanation of this
asymmetric result is that processing in developing countries
starts from a lower base so that a given shift of processing
volume from North to South generates a small percentage loss
in the developed countries and a large percentage increase in
the developing countries. Moreover, liberalization increases
total world final consumption and hence, the size of the
processing pie. The results appeared to be quite robust for
changes in supply and demand elasticities.32
5.2. General equilibrium evidence.
There have been two attempts to estimate effective
protection on the basis of a general equilibrium model: by
Evans (1972 for Australia and by Deardorff and Stern (1983).
Underneath we present the most important conclusions of these
studies.
On the basis of 1958~59 input-output tables for Australia
Evans has formulated for 36 industries a non-linear
programming model in order to analyse for a l0-year planning
period the effects of protection. Evans is interested in the
direct estimation of output changes, which are a better
indication of the resource-pull effects of protection than the
traditional measure of effective protection in terms of value
added. In his opinion, when a general equilibrium model has
been specified and empirically estimated, it is not necessary
to have a summarizing measure such as effective protection to
determine the effects of the tariff structure on the
allocation of resources.
On the basis of a numerical solution of the model he
concludes that, comparing the rank correlation of industries
between the change in value added and the change in output,
the measure of effective protection provides an incorrect
resource pull signal. The inconsistency between the measure of
effective protection and the actual change in outputs appears
from the fact that in six industries the signs of the change
in unit value aded and the change in output are reversed. For
all industries in a model without growth constraints he has
found a Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 0.63.
Therefore, Evans concludes: "These results indicate the
serious failure of the measure of effective protection in the
general equilibrium case."
The most sophisticated general equilibrium model to
estimate effective protection is from Deardorff and Stern
(1983) on the basis of their disaggregated Michigan Model of
World Production and Trade. The model incorporates supply and
demand functions and market-clearing conditions for 22
tradeable and 7 nontradeble industries in 18 developed and 16
developing countries plus an aggregated rest of the world. To
describe technology input-output tables of 1972 for the United
States and the 1970 national tables for the individual EEC-
member countries and for Japan have been used. The 1970 input-
output table for Brazil has been applied to all developing
countries. For five representative countries: Canada, Germany,
Japan, the Netherlands and the United States the effects of
complete elimination of the ruling tariffs of 1976 have been
calculated on the value added.
It has been shown that the simple partial concept of
effective protection according to Corden does not provide an
adequate indication of the structure of protection because the
validity of that concept depends on a number of restrictive
assumptions, such as:33
1) exogenous tariff-exclusive world market prices and perfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods;
2) constant exchange rates;
3) constant foreign tariffs.
Deardorff and Stern have abstracted from these restrictive
assumptions.
ad 1) For small countries the first assumption might be
relevant but large countries affect world prices, so that the
imposition of tariffs reduces its demand for imports so that
world prices fall and domestic prices will not rise by the
full amount of the tariff. If domestic and foreign goods are
imperfect substitutes, so that the prices of domestic goods
vary by less than the prices of imports, then the prices of
outputs will also vary by less than the prices of imported
inputs. This means that the level of effective protection is
reduced.
ad 2) When a country imposes a tariff in most industries, its
trade balance is expected to improve so that its currency will
appreciate under flexible exchange rates reducing the domestic
prices of imports, leading to a fall in effective protection.
ad 3) Industries not only experience protective and anti-
protective effects from their own tariffs but also from
tariffs levied by other countries. Foreign tariffs have an
anti-protective effect for domestic industries. If tariffs
show internationally a positive correlation high tariffs may
lead to a decrease in world demand so that world prices fall
and protection will be reduced. Therefore, a country's own
tariff structure may provide a misleading indication of the
protection afforded to individual sectors. Foreign tariffs
must be included when determining the degree of protection or
antiprotection of individual sectors.
The most noticeable result of their study is that the
model calculations of the effective protection are smaller
than those based on the Corden formula. Table 5 gives an
















Canada 1.8 -0.10 -0.32 -0.37
Germany 5.7 -0.31 -0.28 -0.32
Japan 5.2 0.28 0.10 0.07
The Netherlands 4.6 -1.15 -0.65 -0.87
United States 1.8 0.10 -0.06 -0.09
The decrease of the effective protection from column (1)
to column (2) is due to imperfect substitutability between
domestic and foreign goods. Exchange rate flexibility (compare
column (3) with column (2)) has led to a decrease of the
effective protection except for Germany and The Netherlands.
These two currencies will actually depreciate after
introducing tariffs because protection increases the prices of
the ínputs for the export products so that the trade balance
deteriorates. Taking into account foreign tariffs (compare
column (4) with column (3)) further reduces effective
protection.
On the basis of the Michigan model Deardorff and Stern
have determined the effects of trade liberalization of the
Tokyo Round for the United States, the EEC and Japan. The
conlcusion was that the effects of the Tokyo Round were in the
direction of undoing the protection that previously existed,
but were not strong enough to cause the overall pattern of
protection to change significantly. The nominal tariffs were
reduced the most in those sectors where they were initially
highest. Also for effective tariffs the previously most
protected sectors appear to be the greatest losers from the
Tokyo Round. Sectors with large export shares were the most
likely to benefit from reductions overall.
Finally, Deardorff and Stern examined the employment and
output effects of their general measure of effective
protection compared with Corden's partial indicator, which has
been based on constant world prices. They have found a strong
positive correlation between employment changes in percentage
terms and their measure. Corden's effective tariff changes
showed no significant correlation with employment changes in
developed country trade sectors. Output changes were similarly
well explained by their measure and not at all by Corden's
indicator. These results demonstrate clearly the superiority
of their measure for resource allocation over Corden's
measure. Therefore, the neglect of general equilibrium
repercussions in the calculation of effective rates of35
protection leads to highly misleading results which can
produce harmful economic policies.
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS.
The theory of effective protection has consequences for
ínternational trade negotiations. Negotiations should not only
concern nominal tariffs, but agreement should be reached about
reduction of effective tariffs which indicate how strong
individual production processes are protected. A country
reducing its tariff on intermediate products more than on
final products may in fact become more protectionist in the
final production processes than before. Since equal nominal
tariffs both on intermediate and final products result in
effective tariffs which are equal for all activities, the aim
should be to realize across-the-board tariff reductions.
Since low nominal tariffs in developed coutríes on
processed raw materials may mask high effective tariffs they
may restrict in low income countries the development of
industries for the initial processing of the raw materials
which are abundantly present there.
Many developing countries have tried to stimulate their
industrialization by means of a policy of import substitution,
the results of which have been disappointing. An important
cause has been that the tariff structure in these countries
has prevented the development of the intermediate capital
goods industry, because the effective protection of the final
products has been greater than that of the intermediate goods.
Therefore, resources were drawn into the final goods industry,
increasing their price with negative consequences for the
intermediate goods sectors.
If effective protection generates the socially desired
production volume, effective tariffs provide an indication of
the required artificial support. The greater the required
support, the lower is the comparative advantage of the
industry concerned. A rank ordering of industries according to
their effective protection is equivalent to their competitive
ability on the world market. However, whenever a rational
structure of production is aimed at industries with a hígh
effective protection should be discouraged more than those
with a low effective protection. This implies that industries
with a negative effective protection and which nevertheless
still are competitive deserve the greatest encouragement to
develop their competitive position.
Although at the conceptual level effective tariffs are to
be preferred to nominal tariffs, in actual trade negotiations
industries focus mainly on nominal tariffs because of a desire
to avoid political conflicts with other industries. Moreover,
it is also necessary to utilize nominal output rates because
effective rate estimates are out-of-date or too aggregative to
capture the desired level of detail. Due to the high degree of36
correlation between nominal and effective rates the entire
question is considered, as a practical matter, not very
important. In this respect, Cheh (1974) has found a
correlation coefficient of 0.95 between nominal and effective
rates of protection. For tariff reductions the correlation
coefficient decreases to 0.82 so that the question gains in
importance somewhat. Furthermore, another objection against
many studies is that the regression results have been based on
tariffs what is misleading because there are many other forms
of protection which are substitutes for tariffs such as
subsidies, quotas, voluntary export restrictions and technical
barriers to trade.37
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